Yew Huoi, How & Associates | Leading Malaysia Law Firm

REAL PROPERTY GAINS TAX – SALE OF SHARES OF COMPANY THAT OWNS LAND

My wife and I are shareholders of Company X Sdn Bhd that owns a piece of land in Penang (“Penang Land”). The Penang Land was bought in 2004 for RM10 mil. My wife and I have sold the shares of the company to my friend, Mr. A in 2018. We are required to pay real property gain tax (“RPGT”) if we sell the Penang Land to Mr. A. But we are not selling the land but shares of Company X Sdn Bhd. Are we still required to pay RPGT?

Depends.

  • It depends on whether Company X Sdn Bhd is a “real property company”.
  • Para 34A, Schedule 2 of the Real Property Gains Tax Act 1976 (“RPGTA”) provides that acquisition of “real property company” shall be deemed to be acquisition of the chargeable asset i.e. the Penang Land which will be required to pay RPGT.
  • Para 34A was an amendment to catch individuals who use companies to acquire land and then dispose of the shares in the company as a scheme to avoid payment of RPGT.

Q: What is a “real property company”?

  • A “real property company” is a company that owns land which value is more than 75% of the value of its total tangible assets.
  • If the Penang Land’s value is 75% or more than the total tangible assets of Company X Sdn Bhd, then Company X Sdn Bhd is a “real property company”.

Q: Would there be any difference if Company X Sdn Bhd is a property development company and the purchase of the shares by Mr. A is because Mr. A wants to invest in a property development company. In another words, Mr. A’s intention is not to buy the Penang Land per se.

  • The application of Para 34A, Schedule 2 RPGTA is irrespective of the intention or objective of a person who acquires or disposes the shares in the company. As long as the company falls within the definition of “real property company”, Para 34A applies.

Q: What is a “chargeable asset”?

  • Real property owned by the company which is taxable or chargeable.

Recent Post

LEGAL UPDATES – THE SILENT CURVE: WHY MEDICAL PREMIUMS SUDDENLY SPIKE

Medical insurance premiums do not increase gradually. They rise exponentially. For many years, costs appear manageable, giving policyholders a false sense of stability. However, once the insured reaches their mid-60s, medical charges begin to accelerate sharply, and after age 70, they often outpace the premiums by several multiples.

This happens because medical insurance is funded from a finite pool of money – an investment “bucket” – while the medical rider functions like an engine that consumes more fuel as the insured ages. When the engine grows faster than the bucket can be replenished, depletion is inevitable. The result is sudden premium hikes, demands for top-ups, or policy lapse – not due to misconduct or missed payments, but due to the structural design of the product itself.

Read More »

THE ‘COVER UNTIL 99’ MYTH – WHY INSURANCE AGENTS GET IT WRONG

Consumers must stop relying on what insurance agents say and start reading what insurance policies actually provide. ‘Medical cover until 99’ does not mean guaranteed coverage at an affordable premium. In reality, medical insurance charges rise exponentially after age 70, often making the policy mathematically unsustainable. By the time policyholders realise this, they are told to top up tens of thousands of ringgit or lose coverage altogether.

Read More »

STRATA TITLES ACT – DEVELOPER MUST ACCOUNT FOR COMMON PROPERTY COMPENSATION: HIGH COURT IMPOSES CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST

In JMB Kelana Square v Perantara Properties Sdn Bhd & Ors [2025] 12 MLJ 51, the High Court held that a developer who received compensation for land compulsorily acquired for the LRT 3 project could not retain sums attributable to common property. Although the compensation was paid entirely to the developer as registered proprietor, the Court found that part of the acquired land constituted common property, and the developer therefore held RM6.05 million on constructive trust for the Joint Management Body. The decision affirms that JMBs have proprietary standing to recover compensation for common property and that courts will intervene to prevent unjust enrichment in strata developments.

Read More »

UNFAIR DISMISSAL – MEDICAL LEAVE IS NOT MISCONDUCT: HIGH COURT UPHOLDS INDUSTRIAL COURT’S PROTECTION OF SICK EMPLOYEE

In Aerodarat Services Sdn Bhd v Lawerance Raj a/l Arrulsamy & Anor [2025] 11 MLJ 26, the High Court dismissed an employer’s judicial review and affirmed that prolonged medical leave does not, by itself, amount to misconduct justifying dismissal. The Court held that the employer failed to prove the critical element of intention not to return to work or unwillingness to perform contractual duties, despite high absenteeism caused by serious illness and surgery. The ruling reinforces that employers must distinguish between genuine illness and misconduct, and cannot rely on medical absence alone to terminate employment.

Read More »

WILL AND PROBATE – COURT OF APPEAL INVALIDATES WILL OF 97-YEAR-OLD TESTATOR: CAPACITY, SUSPICION AND UNDUE INFLUENCE PROVED

In Kong Kin Lay & Ors v Kong Kin Siong & Ors [2025] 5 MLJ 891, the Court of Appeal set aside a will executed by a 97-year-old testator, holding that there was real doubt as to testamentary capacity, compounded by serious suspicious circumstances and undue influence by certain beneficiaries. The Court emphasised that while the “golden rule” is not a rule of law, failure to obtain medical confirmation of capacity where doubt exists is a grave omission. Credibility issues with the drafting solicitor, beneficiary involvement in the will’s preparation, and suppression of evidence led the Court to declare the will invalid and order intestacy.

Read More »

NOT AN ‘AGREEMENT TO AGREE’: ENGLISH COURT OF APPEAL SAVES LONG-TERM SUPPLY CONTRACT DESPITE OPEN PRICE CLAUSE

In KSY Juice Blends UK Ltd v Citrosuco GmbH [2025] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 581, the UK Court of Appeal held that a long-term supply contract was not unenforceable merely because part of the price was stated as “open price to be fixed”. The Court implied a term that, in the absence of agreement, the price would be a reasonable or market price, noting that the product’s value could be objectively benchmarked against the market price of frozen concentrated orange juice. Emphasising that courts should preserve commercial bargains rather than destroy them, the decision confirms that section 8(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 operates as a saving provision, not a bar to enforceability.

Read More »
zh_TWZH
× 联系我们