Yew Huoi, How & Associates | Leading Malaysia Law Firm

CONTRACT – CHALLENGING RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS: CAN A SOLICITOR BE BARRED FROM PRACTICING?

Illustrative Scenario

The plaintiff, an advocate and solicitor, is the sole proprietor of the legal firm “Wringglesworth & Company” based in Kota Bharu, Kelantan. The defendant, also an advocate, was previously employed by the plaintiff’s firm. On 10.9.1962, the defendant entered into a service agreement with the plaintiff’s firm. However, on 7.12.1963, the plaintiff agreed to release the defendant from the terms of the agreement, effective 31.12.1963.

Clause 8 of the service agreement stipulated that the defendant, after termination, could not practice as an advocate and solicitor or engage in any legal business within a 5-mile radius of Kota Bharu for two years without the plaintiff’s written consent. The plaintiff has not provided this consent.

Key Issues

  • Can the plaintiff lawfully prevent the defendant from practicing as an advocate and solicitor based on Clause 8?
  • Can the plaintiff solely rely on the signed mutual agreement to enforce this restraint?
  • Is Clause 8 enforceable as part of the terms and obligations of the service agreement?

Application to the Scenario

  • The court will likely assess this case by interpreting Section 28 of the Contracts (Malay States) Ordinance, 1950, which is identical to Section 28 of the Contracts Act 1950. The plaintiff’s letter to the defendant dated 7.12.1963 will also be relevant.
  • Section 28 provides that, except for three specific exceptions, any agreement that restricts someone from exercising a lawful profession is void. Therefore, the restraint imposed on the defendant under Clause 8, which prevents him from practicing as an advocate within a specific area, may be deemed void.
  • The defendant is legally entitled to practice as an advocate and solicitor in Malaya, making any agreement restricting his ability to do so unenforceable.
  • The language used in the plaintiff’s letter to discharge the defendant from the service agreement is clear and unequivocal. Clause 8, being part of the “terms and obligations of the service agreement,” falls within the scope of this discharge.
  • Given these considerations, the court is likely to rule in favor of the defendant and dismiss the plaintiff’s claim, with costs awarded to the defendant.

Reference Cases

  • Charlesworth v MacDonald (1898) ILR 23 Bom 113
  • Brahmaputra Tea Co Ltd v Scarth (1885) ILR 11 Cal 545

Recent Post

CIVIL PROCEDURE – STRIKE OUT UNDER ORDER 18 RULE 19(1)(A),(B) RULES OF COURT 2012 – EXTENSION OF TIME APPLICATION

In Badan Pengurusan Subang Parkhomes v Zen Estates Sdn Bhd [2025] MLJU 3591, the High Court reaffirmed that non-compliance with Order 37 Rule 1(5) of the Rules of Court 2012 does not automatically invalidate assessment of damages proceedings. The Court held that procedural rules must be read with the overriding objective of ensuring justice, and that the six-month time limit to file a Notice of Appointment is directory, not mandatory. Finding no prejudice to the defendant and noting active case management by the plaintiff, the Court dismissed the developer’s strike-out bid and allowed an extension of time for assessment to proceed. The decision underscores the judiciary’s commitment to substantive fairness over procedural rigidity in post-judgment proceedings.

Read More »

TORT – PURE ECONOMIC LOSS BAR REAFFIRMED: MMC LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE BUT PROTECTED FROM LOST PROFIT CLAIMS

In Asia Pacific Higher Learning Sdn Bhd v Majlis Perubatan Malaysia & Anor [2025] MLJU 3144, the High Court awarded over RM2 million in damages against the Malaysian Medical Council (MMC) for negligence, breach of statutory duty, and misfeasance during its accreditation of Lincoln University College’s medical programmes. While the court allowed direct financial losses such as survey costs, it barred claims exceeding RM550 million for lost profits, reaffirming the Federal Court’s rulings in Steven Phoa and UDA Holdings that pure economic loss is not recoverable from public or statutory bodies. The second defendant was further ordered to pay RM100,000 in exemplary damages for acting with targeted malice, marking a rare personal liability finding against a regulatory officer.

Read More »

ERINFORD INJUNCTION – COURT OF APPEAL CLARIFIES: EX-PARTE ERINFORD INJUNCTIONS ARE THE EXCEPTION, NOT THE RULE

In Edisijuta Parking Sdn Bhd v TH Universal Builders Sdn Bhd & Anor [2025] 5 MLJ 524, the Court of Appeal clarified that ex parte Erinford injunctions at the appellate stage should only be granted in truly exceptional circumstances where giving notice would defeat the purpose of the order. Wong Kian Kheong JCA held that, under rule 50 of the Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994, such applications should generally be heard inter partes to ensure fairness and prevent abuse. Exercising powers under section 44(1) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, the Court granted a conditional interim Erinford injunction pending appeal, fortified by a RM200,000 deposit and an undertaking to pay damages. The ruling provides clear guidance on balancing urgency, procedural fairness, and judicial efficiency in appellate injunctions.

Read More »

TOTAL FAILURE CONSIDERATION – FEDERAL COURT OVERRULES BERJAYA TIMES SQUARE: TOTAL FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION REDEFINED

In Lim Swee Choo & Anor v Ong Koh Hou @ Won Kok Fong [2025] 6 MLJ 327, the Federal Court unanimously overruled Berjaya Times Square Sdn Bhd v M Concept Sdn Bhd and clarified that the doctrine of total failure of consideration applies only to restitutionary relief, not to contractual termination. The Court held that the correct test is whether the promisor has performed any part of the contractual duties in respect of which payment is due, adopting Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Co [1998] 1 WLR 574. Finding that the appellants had partly performed their obligations and the respondent had derived benefits, the Court rejected the respondent’s claim for restitution and restored the appellants’ contractual claim. The landmark decision restores clarity between contract and restitution, reinforcing commercial certainty in Malaysian law.

Read More »

CONTRACT (BILL OF LADING) – NO DUTY TO DETECT FRAUD: COURT CLEARS MAERSK OF LIABILITY FOR FALSE CONTAINER WEIGHTS

In Stournaras Stylianos Monoprosopi EPE v Maersk A/S [2025] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 323, the English Commercial Court held that carriers are not liable for fraudulent misdeclarations by shippers where bills of lading are issued for sealed containers. The Court ruled that Maersk had no duty to verify or cross-check declared weights against Verified Gross Mass (VGM) data under the SOLAS Convention, as its obligation under the Hague Rules extended only to the apparent external condition of cargo. However, the judgment signals that a limited duty of care could arise in future where a carrier is put on notice of fraud. For now, carriers may rely on shipper declarations, but consignees must exercise commercial vigilance and due diligence when relying on bills for payment.

Read More »

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES – STATUTORY BODY DUTY – DAMAGES – OBTAINING APPROVAL

In Big Man Management Sdn Bhd v Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2025] 5 MLJ 290, the Federal Court reinstated nearly RM3.56 million in special damages and awarded RM100,000 in exemplary damages against TNB for wrongfully disconnecting electricity to an ice factory. The Court ruled that “strict proof” of special damages does not mean a higher burden beyond the civil standard of proof and affirmed that TNB, as a statutory monopoly, breached its statutory duty by using disconnection as leverage to collect payment. The judgment underscores that public utilities cannot misuse statutory powers, and consumers wrongfully deprived of essential services may be entitled to punitive remedies in exceptional cases.

Read More »
zh_TWZH
× 联系我们