Yew Huoi, How & Associates | Leading Malaysia Law Firm

ARBITRATION – SEAT OF ARBITRATION – DOMESTIC ARBITRATION

In brief

  •  The Federal Court held in Masenang Sdn Bhd v Sabanilam Enterprise Sdn Bhd that the courts of first instance of the place specified as the seat of arbitration in Malaysia have exclusive supervisory jurisdiction over arbitrations seated there, including any award arising from such proceedings. In this regard, a court of a Malaysian state that is not the court of the arbitration’s seat will have no supervisory authority over the arbitration or its award. As a result, parties desiring to have their arbitrations seated in Malaysia must select a specific Malaysian state or city as the arbitration seat.

Q. What happens if one High Court recognizes an arbitral award but another High Court refuses to recognize the identical arbitral award?

A. In Masenang Sdn Bhd v. Sabanilam Enterprise Sdn Bhd, the Federal Court was faced with this situation. [1] The Federal Court unanimously decided on 3.9.2021, that the seat of arbitration cannot simply be “Malaysia” as a whole, even for domestic arbitrations. The seat, i.e., a specific site in Malaysia, must be stated, and the courts in that location shall have exclusive supervisory jurisdiction. Because it would “give rise to deception and disorder,” and the party can no longer bring a challenge to the courts anywhere in Malaysia.

What is the law that governs both domestic and international arbitrations?

  •  Both domestic and international arbitrations in Malaysia are governed by the Arbitration Act 2005 (“AA 2005”). Section 2 of the AA 2005 defines “High Court” to mean the “High Court in Malaya and the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak or either of them, as the case may require…”.
  •  The seat of arbitration is dealt with in Section 22 of the AA 2005, which states that: 1) The parties are allowed to agree on the seat of arbitration. (2) If the parties fail to agree under subsection (1), the arbitral tribunal will select the seat of arbitration based on the facts of the case, including the convenience of the parties.
  • Furthermore, Section 37 of the AA 2005 allows for the revocation of both domestic and international arbitral awards: (1) The High Court may set aside an award only if…”
  •  As a result, the reference to the “High Court” in Section 37 of the AA 2005 refers to either the High Court in Malaya or the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak, as the case may be. The question is whether the High Court of Malaya and the High Courts of Sabah and Sarawak have independent supervisory jurisdictions over arbitrations or arbitral awards in Malaysia

Decision of Federal court

  •  The Federal Court initially evaluated whether the principle of the “juridical seat” of arbitration has relevance or application in domestic arbitrations within Malaysia before going into the legal issues.
  • The Federal Court, in contrast to the Court of Appeal, found that the seat of arbitration in a domestic arbitration, i.e., the specified location within Malaysia, is a relevant consideration in determining the jurisdiction of the courts, in order to avoid multiple proceedings and conflicting decisions, and, most importantly, to maintain party autonomy.
  •  Because the arbitration is held in Kuala Lumpur, the KL High Court has exclusive supervisory authority over the arbitration and, naturally, the Award. The KK High Court’s judgement to set aside the Award, KK High Court Decision No. 2, was thus declared null and void, and the KL High Court’s decision allowing the Award to be recognized and enforced, i.e., KL High Court Decision, prevailed.

Conclusion

  •  The Federal Court’s decision harmonizes the concept of “juridical seat” in domestic arbitration with that in international arbitration, where if the parties agree that the seat of arbitration should be Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the court with supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration must be the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur.
  •  It makes no difference where the cause of action arose; the appointed seat of arbitration determines which court has supervisory authority over the arbitration.

Sorotan Terkini

LEGAL UPDATES – THE SILENT CURVE: WHY MEDICAL PREMIUMS SUDDENLY SPIKE

Medical insurance premiums do not increase gradually. They rise exponentially. For many years, costs appear manageable, giving policyholders a false sense of stability. However, once the insured reaches their mid-60s, medical charges begin to accelerate sharply, and after age 70, they often outpace the premiums by several multiples.

This happens because medical insurance is funded from a finite pool of money – an investment “bucket” – while the medical rider functions like an engine that consumes more fuel as the insured ages. When the engine grows faster than the bucket can be replenished, depletion is inevitable. The result is sudden premium hikes, demands for top-ups, or policy lapse – not due to misconduct or missed payments, but due to the structural design of the product itself.

Read More »

THE ‘COVER UNTIL 99’ MYTH – WHY INSURANCE AGENTS GET IT WRONG

Consumers must stop relying on what insurance agents say and start reading what insurance policies actually provide. ‘Medical cover until 99’ does not mean guaranteed coverage at an affordable premium. In reality, medical insurance charges rise exponentially after age 70, often making the policy mathematically unsustainable. By the time policyholders realise this, they are told to top up tens of thousands of ringgit or lose coverage altogether.

Read More »

STRATA TITLES ACT – DEVELOPER MUST ACCOUNT FOR COMMON PROPERTY COMPENSATION: HIGH COURT IMPOSES CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST

In JMB Kelana Square v Perantara Properties Sdn Bhd & Ors [2025] 12 MLJ 51, the High Court held that a developer who received compensation for land compulsorily acquired for the LRT 3 project could not retain sums attributable to common property. Although the compensation was paid entirely to the developer as registered proprietor, the Court found that part of the acquired land constituted common property, and the developer therefore held RM6.05 million on constructive trust for the Joint Management Body. The decision affirms that JMBs have proprietary standing to recover compensation for common property and that courts will intervene to prevent unjust enrichment in strata developments.

Read More »

UNFAIR DISMISSAL – MEDICAL LEAVE IS NOT MISCONDUCT: HIGH COURT UPHOLDS INDUSTRIAL COURT’S PROTECTION OF SICK EMPLOYEE

In Aerodarat Services Sdn Bhd v Lawerance Raj a/l Arrulsamy & Anor [2025] 11 MLJ 26, the High Court dismissed an employer’s judicial review and affirmed that prolonged medical leave does not, by itself, amount to misconduct justifying dismissal. The Court held that the employer failed to prove the critical element of intention not to return to work or unwillingness to perform contractual duties, despite high absenteeism caused by serious illness and surgery. The ruling reinforces that employers must distinguish between genuine illness and misconduct, and cannot rely on medical absence alone to terminate employment.

Read More »

WILL AND PROBATE – COURT OF APPEAL INVALIDATES WILL OF 97-YEAR-OLD TESTATOR: CAPACITY, SUSPICION AND UNDUE INFLUENCE PROVED

In Kong Kin Lay & Ors v Kong Kin Siong & Ors [2025] 5 MLJ 891, the Court of Appeal set aside a will executed by a 97-year-old testator, holding that there was real doubt as to testamentary capacity, compounded by serious suspicious circumstances and undue influence by certain beneficiaries. The Court emphasised that while the “golden rule” is not a rule of law, failure to obtain medical confirmation of capacity where doubt exists is a grave omission. Credibility issues with the drafting solicitor, beneficiary involvement in the will’s preparation, and suppression of evidence led the Court to declare the will invalid and order intestacy.

Read More »

NOT AN ‘AGREEMENT TO AGREE’: ENGLISH COURT OF APPEAL SAVES LONG-TERM SUPPLY CONTRACT DESPITE OPEN PRICE CLAUSE

In KSY Juice Blends UK Ltd v Citrosuco GmbH [2025] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 581, the UK Court of Appeal held that a long-term supply contract was not unenforceable merely because part of the price was stated as “open price to be fixed”. The Court implied a term that, in the absence of agreement, the price would be a reasonable or market price, noting that the product’s value could be objectively benchmarked against the market price of frozen concentrated orange juice. Emphasising that courts should preserve commercial bargains rather than destroy them, the decision confirms that section 8(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 operates as a saving provision, not a bar to enforceability.

Read More »
ms_MYMY
× Hubungi Kami