CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – ANTI-TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS AND ANTI-SMUGGLING OF IMMIGRANTS – CONSTITUTIONAL CLASH: EXAMINING LEGISLATIVE OVERREACH IN EVIDENCE LAW – PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE

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ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO

X is charged with smuggling three immigrants under Section 12 of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act 2007 (“ATIPSOM 2007”). The prosecution’s case relies on several pieces of evidence, including a deposition by one of the immigrants recorded under Section 61A of ATIPSOM, which states that such a deposition shall be admitted as prima facie evidence without further proof. X contended that this provision violated the doctrine of separation of powers under Article 121(1) of the Federal Constitution (“FC”), asserting that Parliament overstepped its bounds by determining what constitutes prima facie evidence.

KEY ISSUES

Is Section 61A of ATIPSOM unconstitutional for encroaching on judicial power?
Did Parliament violate the separation of powers doctrine under Article 121(1) of the Federal Constitution by legislating what qualifies as prima facie evidence?

LEGAL PRINCIPLES & LAW

Section 61A ATIPSOM 2007 mandates that depositions are admitted as prima facie evidence without further proof.
Article 121(1) Federal Constitution ensures the separation of powers between the Legislative, Judicial, and Executive branches.
Article 4(1) Federal Constitution provides that the FC is the supreme law of Malaysia.
Section 12 ATIPSOM outlines penalties for smuggling of persons.

APPLICATION AND SENTENCING

The appellant’s claim was that Section 61A of ATIPSOM undermines judicial independence by predetermining the status of evidence, which should be the purview of the courts. However, the court rejected this argument for the following reasons:

Section 61A of ATIPSOM does not usurp judicial power because courts still have the authority to assess and evaluate the evidence independently, thus preserving judicial sovereignty.
The provision does not relieve the prosecution of its duty to establish a prima facie case; it simply allows certain evidence to be initially accepted as credible.
Prima facie evidence remains subject to rebuttal and is not considered conclusive proof.

REFERENCE CASES

PP v. Ong Cheng Heong [1998] 4 CLJ 209
Taiwan Chief Precision Technology Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Li Yo Electronics Sdn Bhd) v. Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2014] 4 CLJ 23
PP v. Ketheeswaran Kanagaratnam & Anor [2024] 2 CLJ 341

Sorotan Terkini

JURISDICTION – CHOOSING THE RIGHT COURT: THE SEA JUSTICE CASE HIGHLIGHTS WHERE MARITIME DISPUTES SHOULD BE HEARD

In The Sea Justice cases [2024] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 383 and [2024] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 429, the Singapore courts tackled a key question: which country should handle a maritime dispute when incidents span international waters? After examining the location of the collision, existing limitation funds in China, and witness availability, the courts concluded that China was the more appropriate forum. This ruling highlights that courts will often defer to the jurisdiction with the closest ties to the incident, ensuring efficient and fair handling of cross-border maritime disputes. This approach is also relevant in Malaysia, where similar principles apply.