Medical insurance premiums do not increase gradually. They rise exponentially. For many years, costs appear manageable, giving policyholders a false sense of stability. However, once the insured reaches their mid-60s, medical charges begin to accelerate sharply, and after age 70, they often outpace the premiums by several multiples.
This happens because medical insurance is funded from a finite pool of money – an investment “bucket” – while the medical rider functions like an engine that consumes more fuel as the insured ages. When the engine grows faster than the bucket can be replenished, depletion is inevitable. The result is sudden premium hikes, demands for top-ups, or policy lapse – not due to misconduct or missed payments, but due to the structural design of the product itself.
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TORT LAW- DEFAMATION- FAIR COMMENT
Upon viewing a report, Mr. A (a politician) had made a statement about Mr. C that he had used the public funds for a national cattle farming project to purchase three units of houses. Mr. C sued Mr. A on the basis that the defamatory statement made had tarnished his reputation and character. Can Mr. C sue Mr. A on the grounds of defamation?
Q: What is defamation?
A: Defamation is a statement made by a person that tarnishes a person’s reputation. It can be made in writing (considered “libel”) or orally (considered “slander”).
Q: Must Mr. C incur financial losses before he can sue Mr. A?
A: No, he can sue for damages as long as his reputation is tarnished.
Q: Is there any defence to an action for defamation?
A: If Mr. A has genuinely given a view on a fact proven to be true, he can then raise the defence to his statement made, that is, he has only made a “fair comment” rather than a defamatory statement.
Q: What is a “fair comment”?
A: A “fair comment” is a comment given based on proven fact.
Three elements of a “fair comment”:
Q: Is there a cap to compensation on defamation?
A: There is no known cap. The court will look at the facts and the following factors to decide how much the compensation would be:
Q: How long is the limitation period to file a claim for defamation?
A: For West Malaysia, the limitation period is 6 years from the date the defendant published the defamatory statement.
Recent Post
LEGAL UPDATES – THE SILENT CURVE: WHY MEDICAL PREMIUMS SUDDENLY SPIKE
Medical insurance premiums do not increase gradually. They rise exponentially. For many years, costs appear manageable, giving policyholders a false sense of stability. However, once the insured reaches their mid-60s, medical charges begin to accelerate sharply, and after age 70, they often outpace the premiums by several multiples.
This happens because medical insurance is funded from a finite pool of money – an investment “bucket” – while the medical rider functions like an engine that consumes more fuel as the insured ages. When the engine grows faster than the bucket can be replenished, depletion is inevitable. The result is sudden premium hikes, demands for top-ups, or policy lapse – not due to misconduct or missed payments, but due to the structural design of the product itself.
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In Kong Kin Lay & Ors v Kong Kin Siong & Ors [2025] 5 MLJ 891, the Court of Appeal set aside a will executed by a 97-year-old testator, holding that there was real doubt as to testamentary capacity, compounded by serious suspicious circumstances and undue influence by certain beneficiaries. The Court emphasised that while the “golden rule” is not a rule of law, failure to obtain medical confirmation of capacity where doubt exists is a grave omission. Credibility issues with the drafting solicitor, beneficiary involvement in the will’s preparation, and suppression of evidence led the Court to declare the will invalid and order intestacy.
NOT AN ‘AGREEMENT TO AGREE’: ENGLISH COURT OF APPEAL SAVES LONG-TERM SUPPLY CONTRACT DESPITE OPEN PRICE CLAUSE
In KSY Juice Blends UK Ltd v Citrosuco GmbH [2025] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 581, the UK Court of Appeal held that a long-term supply contract was not unenforceable merely because part of the price was stated as “open price to be fixed”. The Court implied a term that, in the absence of agreement, the price would be a reasonable or market price, noting that the product’s value could be objectively benchmarked against the market price of frozen concentrated orange juice. Emphasising that courts should preserve commercial bargains rather than destroy them, the decision confirms that section 8(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 operates as a saving provision, not a bar to enforceability.