In Kanagasingam a/l Kandiah v Shireen a/p Chelliah Thiruchelvam & Anor [2026] 7 MLJ 494, the High Court set aside spousal maintenance and committal orders after finding that the ex-wife had fraudulently concealed her remarriage, which by law extinguished her entitlement under section 82 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976. The Court held that consent orders obtained through non-disclosure were vitiated by fraud and ordered repayment of RM310,000, together with RM400,000 in aggravated damages and RM300,000 in exemplary damages. The decision underscores that fraud unravels all, even in family proceedings, and that courts will not hesitate to impose punitive consequences for abuse of process.
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TORT LAW- DEFAMATION- FAIR COMMENT
Upon viewing a report, Mr. A (a politician) had made a statement about Mr. C that he had used the public funds for a national cattle farming project to purchase three units of houses. Mr. C sued Mr. A on the basis that the defamatory statement made had tarnished his reputation and character. Can Mr. C sue Mr. A on the grounds of defamation?
Q: What is defamation?
A: Defamation is a statement made by a person that tarnishes a person’s reputation. It can be made in writing (considered “libel”) or orally (considered “slander”).
Q: Must Mr. C incur financial losses before he can sue Mr. A?
A: No, he can sue for damages as long as his reputation is tarnished.
Q: Is there any defence to an action for defamation?
A: If Mr. A has genuinely given a view on a fact proven to be true, he can then raise the defence to his statement made, that is, he has only made a “fair comment” rather than a defamatory statement.
Q: What is a “fair comment”?
A: A “fair comment” is a comment given based on proven fact.
Three elements of a “fair comment”:
Q: Is there a cap to compensation on defamation?
A: There is no known cap. The court will look at the facts and the following factors to decide how much the compensation would be:
Q: How long is the limitation period to file a claim for defamation?
A: For West Malaysia, the limitation period is 6 years from the date the defendant published the defamatory statement.
Sorotan Terkini
EMPLOYMENT – RETRENCHMENT – INDUSTRIAL COURT UPHOLDS GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING: REDUNDANCY VALID DESPITE ONGOING WORK OVERSEAS
In Sin Leong v BT Systems (M) Sdn Bhd [2025] 4 ILJ 221, the Industrial Court upheld the employer’s retrenchment exercise following a global restructuring, ruling that the claimant was lawfully dismissed due to genuine redundancy. Although the claimant’s functions continued in India, the Court held that the abolition of the entire Malaysian team sufficed to establish redundancy. The company’s profitability did not negate the restructuring, and the LIFO principle did not apply since the whole department was closed. The decision reinforces that courts will respect managerial prerogative, provided the retrenchment is bona fide and not tainted by mala fide or victimisation.
DECREE NISI – ADULTERY AND FRAUD – NOT CONCEAL REMARRIAGE – COLLUSION EVIDENCE
In Kanagasingam a/l Kandiah v Shireen a/p Chelliah Thiruchelvam & Anor [2026] 7 MLJ 494, the High Court set aside spousal maintenance and committal orders after finding that the ex-wife had fraudulently concealed her remarriage, which by law extinguished her entitlement under section 82 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976. The Court held that consent orders obtained through non-disclosure were vitiated by fraud and ordered repayment of RM310,000, together with RM400,000 in aggravated damages and RM300,000 in exemplary damages. The decision underscores that fraud unravels all, even in family proceedings, and that courts will not hesitate to impose punitive consequences for abuse of process.
FEDERAL COURT SAVES SECTION 233 CMA: ‘OFFENSIVE’ AND ‘ANNOY’ REMAIN CONSTITUTIONAL
In The Government of Malaysia v Heidy Quah Gaik Li [2026] MLJU 384, the Federal Court overturned the Court of Appeal’s ruling that had struck out the words “offensive” and “annoy” from section 233(1)(a) of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998. The Court held that these terms, when read together with the requirement of intent to annoy, fall within the permissible restrictions on free speech under Article 10(2)(a) of the Federal Constitution. While the impugned words were upheld as constitutional, the respondent’s acquittal was maintained as her Facebook posts criticising immigration detention conditions did not demonstrate the required intent to annoy or harass.
HIGH COURT ORDERS TIKTOK VIDEO TAKEN DOWN: ADVICE ON SECRET CONVERSION OF MINORS VIOLATES CONSTITUTION
In Karnan a/l Rajanthiran & Ors v Firdaus Wong Wai Hung [2025] 9 MLJ 14, the High Court granted a mandatory interim injunction ordering the immediate removal of a viral TikTok video advising how underaged non-Muslim children could be secretly converted to Islam without their parents’ knowledge. The Court held that the advice prima facie breached Article 12(4) of the Federal Constitution, which provides that a minor’s religion must be determined by their parent or guardian. Given the risk of irreparable harm to constitutional rights, the Court found the case “unusually strong and clear” and concluded that justice and the balance of convenience favoured the urgent removal of the video pending trial.
MARITIME LAW – CLAUSES 28 AND 29 BARECON 2001 – OWNERS CAN’T PICK ANY PORT: COURT LIMITS ‘CONVENIENCE’ IN VESSEL REPOSSESSION CLAUSE
In Songa Product and Chemical Tankers III AS v Kairos Shipping II LLC [2026] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 100, the Court of Appeal held that a clause allowing owners to repossess a vessel at a location “convenient to them” does not entitle them to demand redelivery at any distant port of their choosing. The Court emphasised that repossession must occur as soon as reasonably practicable, and where the vessel is already at a safe and accessible port, owners cannot require charterers to incur the cost and risk of sailing it across the world. The decision clarifies that charterers, as gratuitous bailees post-termination, are only obliged to preserve the vessel – not to undertake burdensome repositioning for the owners’ convenience.
MARINE INSURANCE – FRAUD DOESN’T DEFEAT COVER: COURT UPHOLDS MORTGAGEE’S CLAIM UNDER MII POLICY OF MORTGAGEE’S CLAIM
In Oceanus Capital Sarl v Lloyd’s Insurance Co SA (The “Vyssos”) [2026] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 79, the Commercial Court held that a mortgagee was entitled to recover under a Mortgagee’s Interest Insurance (MII) policy despite a forged war risks cover note and a breach of trading warranties by the shipowner. The Court found that the proximate cause of loss was the mine strike, not the forged insurance, and that the mortgagee was not “privy” to the breach, as its consent had been induced by fraud. The decision reinforces that MII policies are designed to protect lenders from owner misconduct and non-recovery under primary insurance, and that fraud will not defeat cover where the mortgagee acted reasonably.